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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 9-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code' specifies, in part,
that:
(1) [T] his Article (on Secured Transactions) applies
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is
intended to create a security interest in personal prop-
erty ....
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by con-
tract ....
A "security interest" is defined, in part, as:
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures pay-
ment or performance of an obligation.2
A common failing, one not unique to members of the legal profession,
is the general tendency to accept documents or instruments by their labels.
If a paper entitled "Equipment Lease" is displayed, and it contains
terms smacking of leases, then it is a lease, without more. If, instead, it
is labeled "Sales Contract" and has those familiar terms such as "earnest
money," "f.o.b.," and "seller," then it is, in our minds, a sales contract
and nothing else. Once so characterized, the transaction pulls certain
basic understandings into a referential framework regarding the rights
and duties of the parties to the transaction and of third parties. The
presence of "legal" formalities and their adjuncts may be particularly
misleading in evaluating the effects of a transaction in which the parties
have, intentionally or unwittingly, created a security interest while using
a device not traditionally recognized for such a purpose.
Generally, the professional commercial lender knows exactly what he
* Attorney at Law, Partner, Foster, Vogel & Stroh, St. Louis, Missouri, LL. B. 1958,
Harvard Law School.
1. All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code unless otherwise indicated, will be
made to the UNIoFR COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS published
by The American Law Institute and the National' Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
2. § 1-201(37).
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is doing when he proposes the form of transaction to be used in a financing
arrangement, and when he casts it in the mold of something other than
one of the traditional forms, he is doing it with some definite purpose in
mind. In states in which the Uniform Commercial Code is in force, the
professional commercial lender has freedom to use his own judgment with
regard to what he will require from his borrower in the way of a security
interest.3 He can make his choice of security devices after analysis of the
lending risks foreseeable in the individual situation, rather than on the
basis of that which is available, as was required under the hypertechnical
and structured framework of pre-Code law.4 His wits sharpened by a
series of running battles with borrowers, courts and tax collectors, he
learned to expect the unexpected in the way of disappearance of collateral,
decision and ruling, and operated with both eyes open wide and neck
swiveling constantly. If a security interest is disguised by the professional,
it is disguised with, at least, some apprehension of the potential risks and
benefits involved. It is possible, however, that the Code has broadened
some of the familiar pre-Code risks and added several new ones.
In contrast, the contracts of the average business are either drawn
or negotiated by a divisional sales manager, the accounting department,
or that bright young fellow in Corporate Planning. The "contract," if so
drafted, is typically based on some other document gleaned from the files
and which was used in what apparently was a similar situation. Those who
negotiate the contract are generally pushing hard to have the transaction
go through in the shortest possible time and cannot see the need for pause
or delay in consummation, which may blow the entire deal out of the
water, for the sake of the lawyer and his red tape. The parties at the time
the bargain is struck do not shape the agreement with anything but
performance (and, perhaps, the latest tax gimmick) in mind. Briefly stipu-
lating those matters which seem to them to be important at the time, they
do not even consider the rest. In so doing, they may use a form of trans-
action in an attempt to reach an end for which it was not intended or may
attempt to accomplish two irreconcilable objectives in a single document,
and thus create a contractual relationship subjecting the entire trans-
action, or a significant part of it, to article 9 where they would not want
it if they gave the matter any thought and for which they are not pre-
pared. Either the creation of such relationship or the application of the
rules of the article on secured transactions 5 may be unwitting, but if the
parties objectively intended a result which constitutes a security interest,
they are in article 9 country.
3. There is a vast amount of literature on this. See, e.g., Symposium-A Practical Ap-
proach to the Uniform Commercial Code for the Practicing Lawyer, 19 Bus. LAW 5 (1963).
4. The liveliest discussion of pre-CODE laws may be found in two parts in Gilmore and
Axelrod, CHATTEL SECURITY: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517 (1948) and Gilmore, CHATTEL SECURITY:
II, 57 YALE L.J. 761 (1948).
5. Art. 9, §§ 9-101 et seq., [hereinafter dted as article 9].
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Enactment of article 9 broadened the definition of "security interest"
to something beyond the sum total of the areas formerly covered by condi-
tional sales, factors liens, chattel mortgages, trust receipts, pledges and
so on. The Code has also broadened the application of the law applying
to secured transactions, not only to reach transactions now redefined as
security transactions, but to reach those parties to transactions, although
defined as security transactions under the common law or pre-Code stat-
ute, to whom the courts refused to apply that law in full to aid rather than
punish. Except in the case of claimed and tentatively proven violation
of some strong public policy, such as that against usury, or fraud, the judi-
cial impulse was to accept a document at face value and leave the parties
in the bed that they made, whether it be of rose petals or of thorns.' It was
a rare court which would allow itself to be propelled behind the facade
of a transaction and then give relief from onerous conditions at the behest
of one of the parties, absent actual fraud or the strong public policy men-
tioned. The Code in its broad definition of security interests and its
definite subjection of transactions intended to create a security interest
to article 9 in full,7 compels judicial investigation of every transaction in
which it is claimed a security interest lies, and subsequent application of
article 9 rules rather than those of article 2, the common law, or the con-
tract provisions.
There are two common business arrangements in which a security
interest may be unconsciously created or may be found by the courts.
One may be a new type of security interest: the chattel acquisition lease;
the other may be an ancient and honorable part of the law of sales: con-
tracts for sale. Both, since they may represent interests taken by sellers
of the property to secure all or part of its price, may create "purchase
money security interests" as defined by section 9-107.
II. CHATTEL ACQUISITION LEASES
Equipment leases, like any other mechanism for transferring title,
possession, or the use of property, may serve legitimate and non-legiti-
mate purposes in business operations as the parties desire.' An enterprise,
by acquiring the use of equipment which it does not own and of which it is
not obliged to become the owner acquires its benefits without its burdens.
A manufacturer faced with a contract job calling for special machinery,
which cannot be used by him following performance, may be able to ac-
quire it for the term of the contract without the need and waste of capital
investment for a piece of eventually non-productive but long-lived prop-
6. Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); Tishman Equip.
Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23, 202 A.2d 504 (1964); Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md.
280, 213 A.2d 875 (1965).
7. §§ 9-102(1)-(2).
8. Comment, Acquisition of Industrial and Commercial Equipment Through Leasing
Arrangements, 66 YALE L.J. 751 (1957).
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erty or the bother attendent to its disposition after it has outlived its
usefulness to him. It may be good business for a meat packer to lease
refrigerator trucks which the lessor is to service and maintain rather than
to buy trucks and establish a trained (and costly) service department and
garage facility. And a business in a field in which there is rapid tech-
nological change may, by leasing its more costly equipment for short
terms, place the burden of obsolescence on the lessor.'
Financing limitations imposed by a debt-heavy balance sheet may
compel an expanding enterprise to acquire the use of new assets by lease
rather than by debt obligation;'" restrictive terms of long term financing
arrangements, the "negative covenants" of trust indentures, and the
overly broad coverage of "all equipment" in financing statements and an
after acquired property clause available in article 9 security interests"
may also force the use of the lease. Further, financial obligations of the
lessee under a lease are not carried on the balance sheet although they
may be just as binding as, and of equal duration as debt obligations;
neither are the leased assets carried, but a leasing program allows corpo-
rate management to practice a not-so-innocent deception on the share-
holders as well as on itself. And a lease arrangement is more suitable for
establishment of otherwise per se illegal restraints of trade and tie-ins
than a sale, since a lease presupposes a continuing interest of the lessor in
the leased property, and the lessor may make periodic inspections, and
so on.
1 2
If such a distinction is possible, tax reasons, as opposed to business
reasons, added the fertilizer to the flower (or weed, if you will) of equip-
ment leasing, causing its increased popularity. Simply, rentals paid for
business equipment are business expenses, and, being deductible from
income, are paid with pre-tax dollars, whereas reduction of principal
indebtedness is made with whatever is left to the taxpayer after taxes are
paid. Interest and depreciation deductions (even at the accelerated rate)
which are available when the equipment is acquired by purchase and
debt, rarely if ever equal the rental deduction in any year, since the term
of a lease in which the lessee also intends to acquire ownership of the
9. See Kearney v. Trecker Corp. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
10. See Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959).
11. Section 9-402, stating the formal requisites of a financing statement, allows a
description of collateral by indicating types or item; in other words each item of
equipment need not be listed. The wisdom of the use of such a financing statement is
questionable, particularly on the part of the debtor, even though the security agreement may
describe specific collateral in detail, broad filings may give the lender tremendous leverage
in the priority race. See § 9-312(5)(a). Section 9-203(1)(b) provides that the security
agreement is enforceable if it contains a "description" of the collateral, and § 9-204(3)
provides for the addition of after-acquired property to the security interest. An actual
lease is not a security interest, so the "first to file" rule would be inapplicable to downgrade
the lessor's interest.
12. See the opinion of Wyzanski, J., in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
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property is generally much shorter than the life of the property for pur-
poses of depreciation, and the rents are correspondingly higher. The lease
of equipment also has a cash-flow advantage, particularly on contract
jobs: the earnings generated by the equipment are used to pay for it or its
use.
13
A true equipment lease, although it may embody a definite obligation
of the lessee to pay for a specified term, does not constitute a security
interest in the leased article since the interest of the lessor is not retained
to secure the lessee's performance, and the lessee has no other rights in
the leased article than those of use and possession for the limited and
specified term. True, bona-fide, or "straight" leases are those ".... calling
for... the 'right to use' described personal property, ... where the rentals
over the term of the lease can be found to bear a reasonable relation to the
average loss in value of the leased property due to aging, wear and tear,
and obsolescence." 4
It may well be asked then: when is a lease not a lease? The answer
supplied by the Code is: when it is a security interest. Section 1-201(37)
supplies some help:
Unless a lease . . . is intended as security, reservation of title
thereunder is not a "security interest". . . . Whether a lease is
intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each
case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does
not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b)
an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease
the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of
the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
A lease is a security interest, at least, when the so-called lessee has or is
acquiring an ownership interest in the property or through performance
of the lease obligation will eventually acquire some form of ownership
interest. Prior to the Code, a lease intended to create a security interest
was classified as a conditional sale, which it most nearly resembled to
courts examining the problem.
There is, therefore, a fund of judical experience available to flesh out
the skeleton supplied by section 1-201(37). Deriving from two main
sources, creditor's suits, including bankruptcy proceedings, and actions
involving the collection of income taxes, the cases demonstrate that the
13. Note, A Lease by Any Other Name: or When Is a Lease a Conditional Sale, 44
B.U.L. REV. 103 (1964); Symposium-Getting Down to Earth on Equipment Leasing
Transactions, 12 PRAc. LAW 9 (Jan. 1966).
14. Hiller, Security Aspects of Chattel Leases in Bankruptcy, 34 FORDHAM L. REV.
439, 439 (1966). A lessor validated high rentals which decreased over the term of the lease
by such a showing in a tax case. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. United States, 195 F.
Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
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problem of identification of a security interest is not a particulary new
one, and that the courts have been able, for the most part, to deal with it.
Because of the terms of the Internal Revenue Code, the approach of the
Revenue Service has been one of analysis on an economics basis, 5 while
that of the courts in the creditor cases tended to be phrased in a legalistic
analysis.16 In actual practice these two apparently divergent approaches
were not so far apart in result as the wording of the cases may have ap-
peared, and the courts in creditors cases have recently moved into the
area of economic analysis openly, rather than covertly.
In a lease, the lessee makes periodic payments perhaps based on the
duration of possession, perhaps based on the amount of use, for the use
of the equipment for either a definite or unspecified term, and acquires
no other interest in it than the right to use and the right to possession;
the lessor remains the owner and regains possession at the end of the term.
In a conditional sale, the vendee, in possession and enjoying the right to
use the item, pays the purchase price in periodic installments over a
definite term to acquire full title. In the eyes of the law, the vendee is
paying to remove a condition to this ownership, for he has beneficial
ownership under the contract, and the vendor has only a title retained for
his security. In the vernacular, the conditional vendee is building up an
equity.
Equipment leases which allowed the lessee to acquire ownership of
the leased item were recognized before the advent of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as a means of dis-
guising that which was essentially a security interest involving purchase
money financing.'7 A type of financing similar to chattel mortgage bor-
rowing could also be done by virtue of the sale and lease-back route, more
commonly used with improved real estate. Chattel-goods, with their
usually movable nature and their comparatively short life do not make
good subjects for sale and lease-back financing if it is not actually used
to finance chattel acquisition. These disguised leases, chattel acquisition
leases really, more closely resembled conditional sales and were un-
15. While according to state law the instrument will probably be taken (with the
consequent legal incidents) by the name the parties give it, the internal revenue
service is not always bound and can often recast it according to what the service
may consider the practical realities.
Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1959).
Rentals, if they are actually rentals paid for the use of trade or business property are
deductible business expenses. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162 (a) (3) ; Rev. Bull. 55-540, 1955-2
Cum. BULL. 39.
16. The conflict is there between parties claiming rights in the "leased" equipment.
Compare Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 213 A.2d 875 (1965) (receivers of lessor and
lessee; transaction held: a lease) with In re Midwest Airmoving Corp., 184 F. Supp. 474
(N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd sub noma., Noll Equip. Co. v. Spilka, 277 F.2d 792 (6th Cir.
1960) (bankruptcy, transaction held: conditional sale). But see In re Atlanta Times, Inc.,
259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (reclamation; transaction held: a lease).
17. See Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925).
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doubtedly originally intended to serve in lieu of such, but the classifica-
tion of chattel acquisition leases as conditional sales in earlier cases may
have placed an unwarranted limitation on judicial analysis of subsequent
transactions.
The use of the chattel acquisition lease rather than a clear purchase
money security interest for the acquisition of depreciable property, be-
fore the days of accelerated depreciation," gave the "lessee" grounds to
expense-out his capital items over a much shorter period of time than that
allowable under straight line depreciation, for the term of the lease was
generally much shorter than the duration of the useful life of the prop-
erty.19 This is not so much tax evasion as would be the case if non-
depreciable property were involved; it is an attempt to time the incidence
of tax. The tax collectors, as might be expected, have not been too sympa-
thetic to taxpayer efforts in this area.
Chattel acquisition leases, in addition to providing an aid to tax
timing, provided the mechanism by which restrictions on the use of the
traditional financing devices were circumvented. Leases generally are not
subject to filing or recording requirements in order to make the retained
interest of the lessor effective against the claims of purchasers, levying
creditors, and the trustee in bankruptcy.20 By not recording, the "lessor"
could save several dollars in recording fees plus the time it takes to walk
to the courthouse, and the "lessee" could avoid the notoriety or stigma of
publicly acknowledging that he was acquiring his equipment on a time
basis. And by not having to record, the lessor avoided several of the acts,
on any of which a fatal misstep could occur, necessary to perfect a pre-
Code security interest.2 In the opinion of the writer, however, this reason,
elimination of the need for recordation, for the use of a chattel acquisition
lease instead of a chattel mortgage or conditional sale has been badly
overworked and overblown by the trade.
Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act22 and many other pre-Code
state statutes,2' the right of repossession of a conditional seller was
materially limited by the vendor's duty to refund a portion of the ven-
dee's payments either automatically or on his failure, after repossession,
to resell and account for the proceeds. A lessor, however, could provide
his own terms of repossession, liquidated damages, and rental prepay-
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 167(b)(2)-(4).
19. See Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) (leased equip-
ment: fire sprinkler system; five year lease 30 years normal useful life) ; In re Herrold Radio
& Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1964)
(leased equipment, electric wiring and fixtures and wall partitions; five year lease).
20. Hiller, Security Aspects of Chattel Leases in Bankruptcy, 34 FORDHAm L. REV.
439 (1966).
21. See United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Lauchli, 150 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1945);
Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931) and cases cited.
22. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 23.
23. E.g., § 428.110 Mo. REV. STAT. (1959) (repealed 1963).
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ments to be applied upon default, aided by the old property rule that the
lessor's retaking the property on the lessee's default does not terminate
the latter's obligation to pay rents, with no automatic statutory or judical
compulsion to sell or re-lease and account for proceeds to the defaulting
lessee.
A chattel acquisition lease may have also been more valuable to the
lessor if he was, himself, financing on his paper, than a conditional sale,
inasmuch as it may have been more saleable in some jurisdictions. A sale
of a purchase money chattel mortgage involved negotiation of the note
secured thereby, and the holder in due course of the note took the mort-
gage free of all of the buying mortgagor's defenses based on the sales
transaction.24 Prior to section 9-206(1), it was doubtful in many jurisdic-
tions whether or not a conditional vendee's agreement to waive claims of
warranty or failure of consideration against an assignee of the contract
was effective.25 Such waivers were sometimes considered to be contrary to
public policy or else invalid as attempts to impart negotiability by con-
tract, and an assignee suing a defaulting conditional vendee could receive
a nasty surprise.26 There seems to have been no reason for such a rule
except the generalized dislike manifested by the courts toward people
in the money business and, indeed, the Code has abolished it.2 7 Ap-
parently, the rule does not obtain in general contract law and such a
waiver by the lessee in a lease was probably effective under general con-
tract law to protect the claim of the assignee of the right to receive rental
payments. 8 In any event the burden of convincing the court that the
lease was really a conditional sale and, more important, should be dealt
with under conditional sale rules was on the lessee both in repossession
cases and in suits for "rents," and such pleas were not apt to be partic-
ularly effective.
Aside from the general statement that the parties to a purported
lease have created a security interest when the lessee acquires an "equity"
or beneficial ownership by virtue of all or some portion of his periodic
payments, no single test or particular combination of factors is deter-
minative in every case. 29 The earliest chattel acquisition leases were rela-
tively unsophisticated, being conditional sales contracts which had been
re-written to substitute the words "lessor" for "seller" and "rentals" for
"time price," and so on." ° The "lessee" acquired title automatically upon
24. The mortgage was ancillary to the note, e.g., Kingsland & Ferguson Mfg. Co. v.
Chrisman, 28 Mo. App. 308 (1887).
25. E.g., Industrial Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App. 1938).
26. § 9-206, Comment 1.
27. § 9-207.
28. An estoppel could be created. Securities Inv. Co. v. International Shoe Co., 5
S.W.2d 682 (Mo. App. 1928). Or the parties may be found to have intended an assignment
free and clear of outstanding claims. Ex parte Asiatic Banking Corp., L.R. 2 Ch. 391 (1866).
29. Rev. Rul. 55-540, § 4, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 39.
30. See Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925); In re
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full compliance with the contract." Such arrangements were resolved by
the courts "on the intention of the parties as gathered from the four
corners of the contract." 2 Although use of lease terms had "undoubted
weight in determining the character of the instrument, it (is) not con-
trolling."3 The courts had little difficulty in finding a conditional sale in
such circumstances. If the lessee was to take title at the end of the term
upon full compliance with the contract, then the lease was really a con-
ditional sale. If, on the other hand, under the terms of the contract the
lessee was required to return the leased item at the end of the term, or if
the lessee could terminate his further obligation to pay rentals by return-
ing the item to the lessor during the term, then generally a true lease could
be found.3 4 Initially, this was a good objective test.
By the magic of negative implication, if a conditional sale was a
contract in which the holder of property received the title to it upon full
compliance with the contract, then an arrangement by which the holder
of the property did not automatically acquire title upon full compliance
was not a conditional sale. That this would not be so was demonstrated by
the judicial counterattack which displayed a degree of flexibility sur-
prising in minds which refused to recognize common law trust receipts
and persisted in classifying them as chattel mortgages or bailments for
sale. From the intention of the parties as gathered from the four corners
of the instrument, the judicial horizon expanded to the intention of the
parties as gathered from the circumstances existing or contemplated at
the time of the execution of the agreement." From the legal effect of the
Midwest Airmoving Corp., 184 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd sub nom. Noll Equip.
Co. v. Spilka, 277 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1960) (Monthly rental payments were embodied into
notes).
31. First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958).
32. Kolb v. Golden Rule Baking Co., 222 Mo. App. 1068, 1071, 9 S.W.2d 840, 842
(1928).
33. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1925).
34. 2 WILLIsToN, SALES § 336 (rev. ed. 1948). Kolb v. Golden Rule Baking Co., 222
Mo. App. 1068, 1071, 9 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1928).
A test usually applied, in determining whether or not an instrument is a lease or a
conditional sales contract, is whether or not such instrument requires or permits the
transferee to return the property in lieu of paying the purchase price. If the return
of the property is either required or permitted, such instrument will be held to be
a lease.
Contra, First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958).
35. The situation of the parties, their purposes, the thing they sought to accomplish,
and the method employed, are all important. Once the intention of the parties be-
comes clear it is immaterial what the instrument is called, nor how skillfully the real
intention of the parties is disguised ...
First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 261 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1958). Contra, "The intention of
the parties must be determined from the language of the lease itself. . . ." In re Atlanta Times,
Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (reclamation proceeding). The court held that
the parol evidence rule and "an entire agreement provision" (merger clause) created a conclu-
sive presumption against the trustee that the lease document embodied the entire agreement
and excluded evidence of an informal option arrangement whereby lessee was to have acquired
the property for a nominal price. Perhaps, such presumptions apply between the parties to
an agreement, but they cannot be allowed to foreclose the rights of third parties when those
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document as written, the courts turned instead to a determination of what
the parties must have actually intended. This then, is still the standard
against which leases must be measured. In the test, every act of the
parties must be weighed in the balance, the practical effect of the trans-
action being closely scrutinized. The courts' analyses were, however, in
terms of conditional sale or lease, since recording acts applied only to
conditional sales and chattel mortgages. Because of the need to find a
conditional sale, the emphasis still rested upon eventual passage of title.
These "second generation" chattel acquisition leases generally pro-
vided that the lessee, at the end of the lease term, should return the
leased property to the lessor, unless he exercised an option to purchase
it.8 The mere existence of an option to purchase or to take title cannot
create a conditional sale; for one reason, such options are otherwise useful
and serve quite legitimate business purposes." But if an option to pur-
chase, to acquire beneficial ownership, during (or at the end of) the lease
term is added to the lease, the arrangement moves somewhat closer in
appearance to a conditional sale, or purchase money security interest, for
if the option is exercised, the lessee may also acquire beneficial ownership
and title under the terms of the contract and no longer must return the
property. However, if the option price, only, represents the value of
"equity" or the cost of acquisition of ownership, the lease still remains a
lease coupled with an option. It is the acquisition of "equity" through
payments made over the term of the contract, i.e., rentals, rather than
through exercise of the option and payment of the option price, which
converts the lease into a security interest.38 An option price of one dollar,
although sufficient consideration to support a contract at law, if bargained
for, fooled no one. If the option price was nominal, then the lease was a
conditional sale; the lessee had acquired "equity" over the course of the
lease. In other words, his lease payments had given him an ownership
interest in the property, as the parties had intended. Therefore, they had
rights arise independently of the agreement. Creditors have generally had the right to go
behind unequivocal documents on a claim of a highly attenuated fraud. See 3 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1967). The trustee in bankruptcy is armed with a creditor's powers and
rights as well as standing in the shoes of the bankrupt, 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.10, at
at 1033 (14th ed. 1964), so the application of the exclusionary rules in In re Atlanta Times,
Inc., supra, is questionable.
36. In re Herrold Radio & Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (Built
in compressed air lines, wiring and partitions) ; In re Crown Cartridge Corp., 220 F. Supp.
914 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
37. In a situation of technological change, for example, a manufacturer may desire to
try a new type machine without making the capital outlay needed to purchase what may be
an unsuitable item, but if it is satisfactory, he may want to buy it. See Kearney & Trecker
Corp. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
38. United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Constr. Co., 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d
570 (1963) (85% of rentals were applicable to the purchase price in the event the option
was exercised; the court found a security interest). Contra, Western Contracting Corp. v.
Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); In re Wheatland Elec. Products Co., 237 F.
Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (option price was a minimum of 25% of list price).
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intended at the execution of the document that the option would be ex-
ercised and the lessee would take title, creating a conditional sale. The
leases were redrawn to make the option price no longer "nominal"; it was
hoped this would indicate that the lessee had a choice to make: exercise
the option and pay a substantial amount to acquire ownership or return
the property. The cost of exercise of the option, no longer "nominal,"
could run in excess of five percent of the list price of the property, perhaps
in the neighborhood of several thousands of dollars. 9 "Nominal," how-
ever, is not only a word of description; it also implies relationship or
degree. The question which should have been asked was: "Nominal" in
relation to what?
The theory by virtue of which the courts ignored the one dollar
option served to test all options. If the lessee had paid over the term of
the lease all, or nearly all, of the lessor's entire cost of the leased item as
rentals, and if the property still had material value to the lessee, then the
rental payments previously made had given the lessee an interest in the
property, compelling him to exercise his option to purchase if the cost of
exercise was less than the value of the property, whether or not he was
under an enforceable duty to do so. He must, as a businessman, save his
investment or "equity" in the property. Therefore, when the option price
was nominal in relation to the then remaining value of the leased prop-
erty to the lessee, the lessee had acquired an interest in it by paying rent.
The parties intended at the time of the execution of the contract that the
option would be exercised and that the lessee would take title. They had,
by economic elimination of the element of future choice essential to the
validity of any option, eliminated the option as a limiting factor to a
finding of conditional sale. The situation, therefore, was the same as in
those cases in which the lessee automatically took title at the end of the
term upon full compliance with the contract. The lessee could not afford
not to exercise the option.40 Where the option price, however, had some
reasonable relationship to the value of the leased item at the option time,
the option could then be considered to be real and the option price the
cost of acquiring beneficial ownership of the property. The rentals, al-
though perhaps high, may be shown to be intended by the parties solely
to compensate the lessor for the lessee's use of the property, and if so,
would be neither in whole nor in part intended as installment payments
for the acquisition of an "equity" in the property.41
39. In In re Herrold Radio & Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (it
was $11,341.00); in In re Crown Cartridge Corp., 220 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (the
option price was 10% of the list cost or $4,505.47).
40. [Tlhat is to say, whether the terms of the contract are such that the lessee's
only sensible course, at the end of the contract term, is to become the owner of the
goods.
In re Herrold Radio & Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
41. If the purchase bears a resemblance to the fair market price of the property,
then the rental payments were in fact designated to be in compensation for the use
of the property and the option is recognized as a real one.
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It is stated in the cases that the existence of the option will be
ignored when the option price is nominal in relation to the fair market
value of the property. One assumes, in addition, that the "nominal" price
of section 1-201(37) is equally so modified. Thus, an option price of
$4,505.47 was considered to be nominal in view of the fact that the
optioned property would have a fair market value of $24,000 at the time
of exercise; total rentals had been $58,616.76 over a period of five years
and the property had cost the lessor $45,054.79.42 The actual measure of
value must be the value of the property to the lessee. Since this can be a
subjective matter, objective economic value may be used as evidence of
value to the lessee, but in some instances fair market value cannot suffice.
Cost of replacement may also be helpful in arriving at a figure. The
choice of the lessee to exercise an option was ignored, and the lessee had
acquired "equity" through rental payments where an option price was
$11,341, but market or salvage value was only $7,935. Wall partitions,
electric wiring and fixtures, and compressed air pipelines, all plastered
over, constituted the leased items. The total rentals were $113,229; the
cost of items was $90,728.29, of which $44,853.70 constituted installation
charges. Assuming that the lessee could tolerate the disruption of its
business while the leased property was torn out and removed at the end
of the lease term, the court found that the value of the property to the
lessee was approximately $53,000.00, since the lessee would have been
required to pay $7,935 to acquire used property in a similar state and to
spend $44,853.70 to install it.43 Such an option price was nominal.
Where there is an option, and the total rentals are equal to, or are
near the list price of the property at the time of the execution of the lease
it is certainly an indication that the parties may have intended a purchase
money security interest,44 particularly when the lease is a net lease and
In re Crown Cartridge Corp., 220 F. Supp. 914, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kearney & Trecker
Corp. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (option prices were set after
serious evaluations of decline in value of property over the term of use; court held that the
contract was not a conditional sale and that lessee, by paying rent, had not acquired an
equity) ; see United Rental Equip. v. Potts & Callahan Constr. Co., 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d
570 (1963) (Court found a security interest).
42. In re Crown Cartridge Corp., 220 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
43. In re Herrold Radio & Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The
Court was not too hard put to sustain the Referee's finding that the lessee was bound to
exercise his option. See also Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959).
44. [A] lease with an option to purchase is not within the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act where, as here, the aggregate payments required of the lessee are not sub-
stantially equivalent to the purchase price (emphasis supplied).
Allen v. Cohen, 310 F.2d 312, 314 (2d Cir. 1962). The court was bound by the former New
York statute, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAWS § 61(2) (1962), converting a lease into a conditional
sale where the lessee contracted to pay as rent a sum equivalent to the value of the goods
and where the lessee is bound to become or has the option to become the owner upon full
compliance with the terms of the contract. It disapproved of American Can Co. v. United
States Canning Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 750, 170 N.Y.S.2d 727, (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 15 Misc. 2d 549, 180 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 1958), in which that court
found a conditional sale in a lease with a purchase option which credited past rentals on the
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the lessee is obligated to assume the risk of loss, insure, and pay taxes,
all of which are incidents of beneficial ownership. Such a showing may
have the effect of throwing the burden of proof on the person attempting
to sustain the lease as a lease by showing the relationship of rentals to
use, and should serve as a red flag for counsel in reviewing such docu-
ments.
Certain of the cases and commentators have stated that, if the
lessee is not obligated by the contract to perform for the full term in
which rentals equal list price, if he can terminate his obligation for further
rentals by returning the leased property to the lessor, then there is no
purchase money security interest.4 5 Again, the document may contain
words granting this privilege, but to determine whether or not the lessee
is obligated to perform the contract fully, the reviewing authority must
evaluate the practical economics of the situation. Where a lease called
for thirty-six equal monthly rental payments over three years and the
lessee was required to pay the intial rental and the last eight months'
rentals in advance, the court found a conditional sale contract.4 6 The
lessee was not obligated by the contract to pay all of the rentals, but if
he did perform fully, the lessor was to transfer the property to him by bill
of sale. If he did not perform, he would lose his advance rental payment.
Although the fact that the lessee had in essence made a twenty-five per
cent down payment which gave him an equity and obligated him to con-
tinue his payments and to comply fully with the contract, the court in
holding the lease to be a conditional sale, merely stated that the personal
obligation of the purchaser to pay the contract price was not essential in
order to render a lease a conditional sale. Probably the existence of an
enforceable obligation of the lessee to make the full contract payments
equal to list price is at best ambiguous in pointing to sale or lease. If the
payments the lessee is obligated to make, either by law or economic pres-
sure, do not at least equal the market value of the leased article at the
time of the execution of the document, the lease is clearly a straight
lease. But if the lessee may continually renew the lease at the end of the
lease period until the rentals, all or any part of which are deducted from
the lessee's acquisition cost, equal the purchase price and the rentals are
so far inflated above normal rentals for the same type of equipment so as
to indicate that by paying rentals the lessee is, in fact, acquiring an
"equity" which he must protect by renewing, the renewal options should
be ignored.
Because the courts in creditor's cases classified leases intended for
purchase price, but in which rentals would not have equalled the purchase price unless the
lease were twice renewed. The approach to such leases suggested in Allen v. Cohen, supra,
seems overly narrow, although the decision there was undoubtedly correct.
45. Note 44 supra; Kolb v. Golden Rule Baking Co., 222 Mo. App. 1068, 9 S.W.2d 840
(1928); 2 WJLISTON, SALES 336 (rev. ed.).
46. First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958).
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security as conditional sales, the intended eventual acquisition of title
by the lessee either automatically or by so-called option became the prime
test of the document; if the lessee took title, or would take title, there
was a sale.47 More sophisticated lessors, naturally, soon found methods
to avoid this test. The option was dropped from the lease; no option was
granted the lessee, and provisions for passage of title were stricken. Where
the lessee had a corporate structure, the opinion could be given in a
supplemental document to a trusted officer, director, or shareholder who
could either exercise the option himself at the end of the lease term and
lease his newly acquired property to the enterprise, perhaps at a nominal
or greatly reduced rate, or else assign the option to the corporate lessee
itself.4" It was simpler, however, since less people were involved, to drop
options completely and provide that the lease could be renewed perpetu-
ally at nominal rents, once the economic value to the lessor plus financing
costs had been repaid by rental payments made over a fractional portion
of the actual economic and useful life of the property.49
The Internal Revenue Service had no problems in ruling that rentals
paid on the perpetual option-to-renew leases, whether paid in the initial
term or in the renewal, were not deductible from income as business ex-
penses. The wording of the pertinent portions of section 23 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 and section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, dealing with business expenses, places the emphasis on the acquisi-
tion of either title or an equity in the property, 0 and the Service, in
Revenue Ruling 55-5401 provided:
The fact that the agreement makes no provision for the transfer
of title or specifically precludes the transfer of title does not, of
itself, prevent the contract from being held to be a sale of the
equitable interest in the property. 2
Although the ruling was ex parte, it is correct in excluding such trans-
actions from the classification of leases. However, these perpetual renewal
leases are not traditional conditional sales; no legal title ever passes
under such leases. They are, instead, a new type of security interest
grounded on economic facts of life rather than rules of law.5" They truly
47. In re Herrold Radio & Electronics Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
"Manifestly, his only sensible course would be to pay the $11,341. Thus, as a practical
matter, he was bound to exercise his option to purchase the equipment."
48. Tishman Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23, 202 A.2d 504 (1964) (Court
refused to read the option given the promoter of a corporation into the lease of lessee cor-
poration. In the absence of fraud, the corporate veil would remain intact).
49. Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); Mt. Mansfield
Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539 (D. Vt. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1965).
50. "[Rlentals . . . of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking
title or in which he has no equity." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162 (a) (3).
51. 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 39.
52. Rev. Rul. 55-540, § 4.02, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 39, 42.
53. It is difficult for this Court to believe that an astute businessman would incur
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represent permanent chattel acquisition by lease, and may be found to be
security interests, for the Code deals, not in title, but in ownership.
Assume, for example, the following situation:
Corporation desires to acquire an addressing machine and re-
lated equipment, and selects these items from Standard's cata-
logue. The list price is $900.02. Standard sells the equipment to
Leasing which executes a five year lease with Corporation calling
for 60 equal monthly net payments of $19.80 (total $1,188.00),
with automatic annual renewals thereafter for $27.00 per year
(3% of the list price). The lease provides for termination at
the end of any renewal period on 30 days prior notice and that
the lessee shall never acquire title to the leased property. The
lease also provides that upon default in rental payments, if not
cured within seven days following written notice of default from
the lessor, the lease will terminate.
Consider the effect of a failure to pay twenty-seven dollars per year after
the first five years have elapsed. The lease is still in existence, and the
lessee holds under the lease, rightfully, until the lessor notifies the lessee
of its default. Until that time the defaulting lessee is only a debtor. In
other words, the possession of the lessee remains rightful, and the lessee is
the owner as opposed to all other claimants, including the lessor, until the
lessor sends a notice of a default which is uncured in seven days. The
lessor has recovered its entire investment and its pound of flesh on the
initial term of the lease. 4 Being in the money business rather than in the
law suit business, is it probable, or even conceivable, that the lessor will
attempt to collect its rental or to replevy the leased items in which it has,
in fact, exhausted its economic interest?5 More probable than not, the
such a large expense in the initial five years of acquisition, only to have the equip-
ment removed (and at the plaintiff's expense) upon the failure to pay the nominal
annual rental of $747.29.
Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Vt. 1964), aff'd
per curiam, 342 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965) (Total rentals for the first five years equalled
$44,904.60; list price of the goods was $38,240. The Court found that the parties intended
a conditional sale).
54. In Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959), the
court in sustaining the transaction as a lease, reversed the Tax Court. The case could be
sustained on a failure of the government's proof to show an enforceable option to compel
the lessor to transfer title. The rentals paid were to be added to the "option" price, which
when totaled equaled the list price, plus. But the equipment was typically offered to the
lessee for purchase long before the rents came remotely close to the list price. The facts
in the case otherwise indicated that the parties were using the arrangement as a substitute
for conditional sales. Contra, United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Constr. Co.,
231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963). (Lessee had an option to purchase and 85% of monthly
rentals of $800.00 were applied to purchase price of $14,500. Apparently, the lease was a
month-to-month lease.)
55. "Also, it stretches credulity to believe that the 'lessor' ever intended to, or would,
4come after' the system." Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1959)
(Five year "lease" of an installed sprinkler system at an annual rental of $1,240; renewals
were available annually thereafter for $32.00 per year. Sprinkler systems, for the purpose of
depreciation, are considered to have a useful life of about 30 years). But see In re Atlanta
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lessor will close its books on the lease at the end of the fifth year to reduce
its bookkeeping overhead, and would be extremely upset and subjected to
additional unbudgeted expense in excess of the amounts of the rental
payment, by the receipt of the lessee's check for twenty-seven dollars.
On such basis, is there any question that the lessor will not assert its
reversionary interest or that it was not intended that the lessee should
acquire ownership in the property, let absolute legal title lie where it may?
The test of a document to determine whether or not it constituted a
security interest or lease as applied by the courts has been unduly re-
stricted by the necessity to fit the security interest into one of the tradi-
tional forms such as a conditional sale. 56 The test under the Code is the
intent of the parties.
Thus the tests which turn on the passage of title automatically or
by "option" on compliance with the contract, or which turn on the ex-
istence of the legal enforceability of the lessee's obligation to perform to
the full course of the contract are, under the Uniform Commercial Code,
too narrow.57 Of course, such tests are still valid, but they are merely
overt indicia of the parties' intent. The analyst of such documents must
more openly consider the economics of lending and the economic facts of
life in business to a greater extent than before. Business thinking has
moved away from the traditional forms of title and legally enforceable
obligations to those forms of dealing which give the right to have, rather
than to own and which are enforceable under their own economic weight."8
Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966). In this case lessor was allowed to reclaim
proceeds of equipment leased for 10 years with substantial life remaining at the end of the
term. The list price [$570,116.10] was substantially exceeded by the rentals payable over
the term [$712,873.00]. The lease contained neither a renewal option nor a purchase option.
Lessee was required to make a $145,000 security deposit, but the decision does not indicate
whether the deposit was to be applied to rentals in the waning days of the lease or was to
be refunded upon return of the leased items undamaged. If the former were the case, it
would have indicated that the lessor's actual interest in the leased items would have been
exhausted over the term of the lease. The situation is certainly marginal, but the writer
believes a security interest was intended. See also cases cited note 35 supra.
56. Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1959) "[W]e do have
the troublesome circumstance that the contract does not by its terms ever pass title to the
system to the 'lessee' . . .. [but] He could have believed only that he was getting the
system for the rental money."
"[A] 'lease intended as security' is one which has the ultimate intent of a sale [sic]."
In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
57. Where it was a custom of the industry, universally followed, to offer leased items to
the lessee, the court refused to read an option into the leasing contract; there had been no
proof that the lessee was aware of the custom. Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner,
271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959). The lessor had financed his leases with a bank with an
assignment of rentals and a chattel mortgage on the reversionary interest, indicating he
did not expect to take the equipment back.
Although "Agreement," § 1-201(3) seems to include "usage of trade" in the bargain
between the parties, it is uncertain whether the CODE would allow the interpolation of an
option to purchase into the "contract," § 1-201(11), or whether "usage of trade" merely
applies to contractual interpretation, § 1-205.58. Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Burroughs Adding
Mach. Co. v. Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United
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That is to say, the economic pressure generated by the contract itself and
the necessity of the sellers to sell and the buyers to buy have been sub-
stituted for the potential resort to court action inherent in "legally en-
forceable" obligations. Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code does not
limit the application of article 9 to the traditional forms of chattel security
agreements. It applies article 9 to any contract intended to create a
security interest.59
There can be one approach to analysis of equipment leases or, for
that matter, any agreement which may fall under the net of article 9, and
that is a determination of the intent of the parties at the time of the con-
tract with close attention directed to the ends which they are trying to
reach, and the action taken by each upon execution. Did they treat it
like a security agreement or like a lease; a transfer of the ownership or a
grant of the right to use?60 With regard to equipment leases, particular
scrutiny should be given the time at which rental payments potentially
payable under the lease, whether or not the lessee is under compulsion
to perform the lease in its entirety, approach the total investment of the
lessor or the market price of the leased article. If at that time the further
estimated useful economic life of the leased property is still substantial
and there is provision for a materially different or reduced performance
under the lease with the lessee to retain the property, either by agreement
or because it is improbable that the lessor will, in fact, repossess it, and
if the lessee is required, during the initial term or terms of the lease prior
to the change of performance, to bear the burdens of its ownership, then
the so-called lease is a chattel acquisition lease, a security interest falling
within article 9.
The difficulty encountered by the analyst in the case of the long
term net lease with no acquisition rights granted the lessee, and where it
cannot be determined whether or not the parties intended that the lessee
would ultimately acquire the propetry under any terms, is occasioned by
the anomalous use of the equipment lease in a financing situation. Under
our own conception of a security interest, conditioned by a tradition
which interpolates the requirement that the interest in property which
States, 239 F. Supp. 539 (D. Vt. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965). But
see In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966), where there was testimony
to the effect that the lessee would have an option to purchase the leased items at a
nominal price. The court stated that even if such evidence were admissible (see footnote
35 supra), the court could find no legally enforceable right of the lessee to gain title and no
way to acquire anything but the right to use the property.
59. § 9-102(1)(a).
60. Lessor financed full value of leased equipment. Western Contracting Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959) (court found no conditional sale). Lessee had the
risk of loss and was required to submit a financial statement and apply for financing.
Rentals were on a net lease basis. Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239
F. Supp. (D. Vt. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Rentals were embodied
in notes given by the lessee. In re Mid-western Airmoving Corp., 184 F. Supp. 474 (N.D.
Ohio 1960).
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secures payment be an interest in the property of another, such leases do
not constitute security interests. Yet take a second look. Although patently
supplying equipment to users, the lessor is in fact in the money business,
as much as any commercial lender, supplying medium term capital by
purchasing equipment to the lessee's order and turning it over to him
under an arrangement which, for tax reasons, is more advantageous to the
lessee than a debt ownership-acquisition transaction. By use of a net
lease for a sufficient term, the lessor assures return of its capital on that
one transaction and avoids the unpredictable risks and burdens of owner-
ship, equating its posture to that of a financing agency whose only interest
in the transaction lies in the return of its investment at a profit. Such
lessors may eventually be recognized as lenders subject to article 9 rules
when their rights come into conflict with those of the lessee's other credi-
tors. Whether or not the lessee eventually is to acquire the leased property
would become irrelevant. There is adequate precedent for such expansion
of the concept of security interest; witness the inclusion of factored re-
ceivables as secured transactions by section 9-102 (1) (b). Although such
sales of accounts are on a non-recourse basis and absolute, they are ana-
logized to financing transactions. This result, however, could only come
from bold judicial pioneering or legislative revision. There seem to be no
indications that such a reversal of tradition is in the near future in an
expanding economy, but the prudent lessor may well be warned and take
precautionary steps. For the present, however, counsel can draw the
lease-security interest line at that point where the right to use becomes
the rights of ownership.
III. CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF PERSONALTY
In the fall of 1963, the Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corpora-
tion became notoriously and hopelessly insolvent."' The collapse was
spectacular and out of the debris arose certain litigation pointing to the
relationship between articles 2 and 9 of the Code. 2
The facts out of which the litigation arose, stripped of elements
non-essential to this paper were these:
Procter entered into a contract to sell vegetable oils to Allied,
f.o.b. Procter's plant, shipped on order bill to Procter's order,
61. N. MILLER, TEE GREAT SALAD OIL SWINDLE (1965).
62. National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 22 App. Div.
2d 420, 255 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1965), rev'd in part sub nom., Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v.
Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785
(1965). The writer is grateful to William W. Owens, Esq., Peter H. Kaminer, Esq., and
Patrick J. Hughes, Esq., all of the New York Bar for furnishing him with the briefs in the
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
This sort of transaction is by no means unique to the commodity trade. See
Metropolitan Vacuum Cleaner Co. v. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp., 208 F. Supp.
195 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The court reached the same result as in the Allied case. See text infra
at 85.
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and stored for Procter's account in a field warehouse maintained
by Field on Allied's leased premises. Allied made a down pay-
ment of twenty-five per cent of the purchase price (called a
"margin requirement") at the time of delivery to the warehouse.
Field issued its non-negotiable warehouse receipts directly to
Procter. Allied was to have power to sell the oil, and on payment
to Procter, or on Procter's delivery order, the oil was to be re-
leased from Field's custody. There was no stipulation in the
contract as to the time of the passage of title in so many words.
When notified of Allied's collapse, Procter presented the ware-
house receipts and demanded the oil. Field was unable to de-
liver, inasmuch as the oil was not in its warehouse, and Procter
sued Field, asking the contract price of the oil as its damages.
On appeal,' it was held that Procter could recover the full market
value of the oil called for in the receipts from Field, which value equalled
the sale price, and Field could not set-off the down payment made by
Allied against the recovery. Procter was therefore given a total recovery
on the transaction equal to 125 per cent of its contract price which is
pretty good business in any man's league. In suits by various lenders who
had loaned money to Allied with Field's warehouse receipts as collateral,
recovery was limited to the lesser of the amount of the indebtedness or
the value of the oil called for by the warehouse receipts held by them."4
The New York Court of Appeals, in passing on Procter's claim,
applied New York law which, it said, was the same as that in force in
New Jersey. The Uniform Commercial Code was in force in New Jersey,
but not in New York at the time of the events giving rise to the action.
Procter's claim to the full sales price (which was assumed to be equal to
the applicable market price as the measure of damages in conversion)
without set-off was sustained on the theory that Procter was still the owner
of the oil, which the court stated without discussion. 5 Since title had not
passed, and Allied did not have possession, Allied had no interest in the
oil. Procter, the injured seller, had the right to apply the down payment
as liquidated damages on its claim of breach of contract against Allied.
Allied as the party breaching the contract could not have recovered the
earnest money paid under an executory contract of sale under then exist-
ing New York law.66 Field could not claim the benefit of the payment in a
transaction unrelated to the field warehousing by Allied, a collateral
63. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d
344, 213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965).
64. National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 22 App.
Div. 2d 420, 255 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1965). The Appellate Division could see no difference between
lenders and sellers such as procter.
65. 16 N.Y.2d 344, 353, 213 N.E.2d 873, 877, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 791 (1965).
66. Kaufmann v. Baldridge, 162 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1947); Thach v. Durham, 120
Colo. 253, 208 P.2d 1159 (1949); Pirman v. Kurtz, 267 App. Div. 258, 45 N.Y.S.2d 508
(1943).
1967]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
source, even if Allied could have recovered the purchase money paid. 7
Field may or may not have had a right to cross-claim for it had Allied
been a party, but Allied was not a party to the suit.
In other words, this was a contract to sell; it was not a sale or a
lending transaction. Any difference between the recovery of the seller,
Procter, and that of those who advanced money to Allied based on Field's
warehouse receipts must be explained by the dimensions of the differing
interests of absolute owners and special interest owners, or lenders.
Under the Code, Procter's interest would have been precisely the same as
that of any of the other lenders. The decision of the New York Court of
Appeals was undoubtedly correct under pre-Code law; the same court
should not today render the same opinion.
Williston defined a contract to sell as a "contract whereby the seller
agrees to transfer the property in the goods for a consideration called the
price," whereas a "sale" was a present passage of title in return for the
price. Under the common law and pre-Code statutes, the buying party
to a contract to sell did not at the time of making the contract receive any
rights in the goods. Procter had not sold the oil to Allied, although it had
been identified with the contract and had been shipped. Procter, as ab-
solute owner, had stored its own goods in a warehouse. It could recover
damages both from Allied, as a seller, for breach of the sales contract,
and from Field in a suit by an owner against a warehouseman, for failure
to deliver the oil. Allied, by breaching the contract, forfeited its down
payment; Field as a defaulting warehouseman, was liable for the full
value of the merchandise, coversion damages. Although those persons who
had loaned money to Allied also were holders of warehouse receipts issued
by Field to them, their recovery against Field was limited to the amount
of the loan.
The transaction between Allied and Procter remained a contract to
sell rather than a sale because Procter had shipped the oil under a bill of
lading to its own order, and placed them in a warehouse for its own ac-
count, thus retaining title to the goods. 9 Without that bill of lading, and
67. Wells v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 39 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. App. 1931) (suits by
bailor on bailment contract, collateral payment by insurer) ; Healey v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d
202, 173 N.E.2d 777, 213 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961) (noncommercial case). The "collateral sources"
doctrine is now generally used to prevent insurance payments from being used to reduce
damages in tort actions; it guards the insurer's subrogation rights. The doctrine is broader,
however, than this, applying to most payments received by plaintiff from third parties who
are unrelated to the cause of action; its application to commercial cases and in instances
where no subrogation rights are involved is questionable. See § 1-106(1). Damages are to be
compensatory. Cereal Byprods. Co. v. Hall, 16 Ill. App. 2d 79, 147 N.E.2d 383 (1958), aff'd,
15 11. 2d 313, 155 N.E.2d 14 (1958) (tax refund to plaintiff on loss from embezzlement
cannot mitigate damages in suit against auditor for negligence). R.E. Dumas Milner
Chevrolet Co. v. Morphis, 337 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (partnership distribution to
plaintiff did not reduce his claim against tortfeasor).
68. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 1 (rev. ed. 1948).
69. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Higgins, 150 F.2d 536 (2d Civ. 1945) (creates security
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absent any agreement to the contrary, absolute ownership would have
passed to Allied at Procter's plant, since the goods were identified or
appropriated to the contract and the contract terms were f.o.b. Procter's
plant. F.o.b. was generally considered to be a delivery term with delivery
taking place at the f.o.b. point. 70 But shipment to seller's order and stor-
age for seller's account in the field warehouse amounted to an intentional
postponement of delivery and delayed the passage of title to the buyer.
Under prior law, passage of title in a sales transaction determined the
rights of both of the parties. Prior to passage the seller had everything,
the buyer nothing. Subsequent to passage of title the buyer acquired a
completely new set of rights and duties with relation to the goods. Except
to the extent that he or someone acting for him retained possession or
control of the goods, the seller lost all of his interest in them. Ownership
was unitary, all of it passed at once or nothing passed.
Section 2-102 provides in part:
This Article (Article 2, Sales) ... does not apply to any trans-
action which although in the form of an unconditional contract
to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security
transaction....
Section 9-113 provides:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales
(Article 2) is subject to the provisions of this Article except that
to the extent that and so long as the debtor does not have or
does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) No security agreement is necessary to make the secur-
ity interest enforceable; and
(b) No filing is required to perfect the security interest;
and
(c) The rights of the secured party on default by the
debtor are governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2).
Article 2 substitutes for the title concept, when evaluating the
rights of buyer and seller, the concept of the bundle of rights, the ex-
panding buyer's interest in the goods and the contracting interest of the
seller as the terms of the contract provide and the various steps of per-
formance by the parties under it are accomplished.7x Where certain third
interest); Christoffersen v. Murray Packing Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 587, 262 N.Y.S.2d 636
(1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 855, 218 N.E.2d 326, 271 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966) (seller may retain
property in the goods). Pottash v. Cleveland-Akron Bag Co., 179 App. Div. 763, 189
N.Y.S. 375 (1921), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 520, 139 N.E. 717 (1923) (draft attached) ; Quigley v.
Wiley, 107 Vt. 253, 179 A. 206 (1935) (draft attached).
70. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Higgins, 150 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1945); McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co., 205 Ark. 780, 171 S.W.2d 62 (1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (when f.o.b.
point was in seller's state, sale took place there). But see Sadler Mach. Co. v. Ohio Nat.,
Inc., 202 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1953) ("f.o.b. cars" was a price term; title passed for
ascertainable, deliverable goods upon contracting).
71. See generally art. 2, part 5.
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party rights and government regulation are concerned, however, title
still has some importance under article 2 and simplified rules for de-
termination of its location are established,'7 for non-Code statutes and
much case law dealing with third party rights are typically phrased in
terms of title.
As performance of the contract takes place, and the buyer acquires
a greater and greater interest in the goods, the seller's interest dwindles to
one which is retained by him to protect his interest in payment of the
purchase price, allowing him to retake the goods and/or liquidate them
by resale on the buyer's default or potential default.7 3 Essentially, then,
such retained interests of the seller are non-consensual security interests
arising solely under the provisions of article 2 to secure performance of
the buyer's obligation.74 They exist regardless of contract until the buyer
obtains lawful possession,7 5 unless the parties contract to exclude the
seller's remedies,7 6 and they clearly fall within the provisions of section
9-113Y.7 Section 9-113 provides the statutory skeleton and flesh to the
seller's security interest rising without an agreement that it arise, and yet
recognizes that the seller is still a seller who, having obtained a security
interest merely by performance of his contract and, without any intent
to become a lender, has still the interests of a seller. Since the seller in this
circumstance has no intention to extend credit and expects to be paid on
physical delivery, at the latest, he cannot be expected to take the steps
generally required of lenders by article 9 for protection.
The status, under the Code of the security interest given the seller
when he takes a bill of lading to his own order is somewhat more dub-
ious. 8 Where the seller identifies the goods to the contract and completes
his performance with relation to their physical delivery, ownership passes
to the buyer unless the parties agree to the contrary. 9 The security in-
terest of the seller obtained by taking an order bill running to his order
does not arise solely under article 2,80 although that article does provide
for such security interests.8 ' It arises by virtue of article 7, governing the
rights of holders and holders by due negotiation of negotiable documents
of title, and giving the holder the right to demand and receive delivery
72. See generally art. 2, part 4.
73. §§ 2-703, -705 to -706.
74. Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial Code:
Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. Rav. 571 (1958).
75. § 9-113.
76. § 2-719.
77. See note 74 supra.
78. §§ 2-505(1)(a), 2-401(1).
79. § 2-401 (passage of title). Comment 1 to § 2-401 makes it clear that the passage of
title is generally irrelevant to the rights and duties of the parties to the contract and third
parties. See part 5 of art. 2 generally.
80. See § 9-113.
81. § 2-505.
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from the carrier."2 Yet, although article 7 gives the holder by due negotia-
tion title to both the goods and document,"3 this right is limited by
article 2, which provides that the seller, who is also a holder, and his
transferee, take only a security interest in the goods.84 Title, or more
properly, ownership, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, would have
passed at the f.o.b. point, since at that time the seller has completed his
duties regarding shipment.85 The use of the order bill of lading with draft
attached has a history as a short term financing device, 80 but its principal
use is to enable the seller to obtain his price before the buyer gains
possession of the goods and examines them.87 Yet, again, the seller con-
templates instant or nearly instant payment on physical delivery to the
buyer. He does not have the posture of a lender. It is probable that the
order bill of lading security interest will be ultimately found to arise solely
under article 2 for this reason. 8
Article 9 rules will apply on default if the order bill of lading does
not fall within section 9-113. Otherwise, the holder of the bill will have a
seller's remedies. With regard to security interests obtained by negotiable
bills of lading, section 9-113, except as it applies to remedies, is otherwise
irrelevant. So long as the buyer does not have possession of the bill of
lading originally running to the seller's order and properly endorsed, he
cannot gain lawful possession of the goods from the carrier. If he does
gain possession of the goods lawfully, then the seller must have relin-
quished his security interest, absent fault of the carrier, and section
9-113 would be inapplicable in any event. If the security interest is
represented by a negotiable document of title, then it is enforceable with-
out a written security agreement, since it is possessory, and it is enforce-
able against the buyer, i.e., not grounds for rejection of the goods, even
though there was no agreement between buyer and seller authorizing it. 9
And the seller's security interest obtained by the order bill of lading does
not have to be perfected by filing, since the goods are in the possession
of the seller or his bailee, the carrier." Section 9-113, therefore, may well
apply to protect security interests of the seller obtained by his taking an
order bill of lading, as well as to those non-consensual security interests
82. § 7-403(1); holders are "persons entitled under the document," since they have a
good chain of title to the document, § 1-201(20).
83. § 7-502.
84. §§ 2-401(1), 505(1)(a).
85. § 2-401(2) ; § 2-319(1) clearly establishes "f.o.b." as a delivery term.
86. Cases cited note 69 supra.
87. § 2-513(3)(a).
88. If only because the order bill is so commonly used to obtain payment before the
buyer can inspect the goods and rightfully reject them. The seller, in such a case, is extending
credit to the buyer only to the extent of not demanding payment before shipment. With
the order bill of lading, he still expects to be paid before the buyer gets his hands on the
goods.
89. § 2-505(2).
90. § 9-304(2).
1967]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
which obtain to the seller solely through the steps taken by him in per-
formance of the contract and before the goods are received by the buyer.
That interest retained by the seller who ships his goods to a field
warehouse on the buyer's premises to be released to the buyer on the
seller's instructions represents, however, an article 9 security interest
outside of the provisions of section 9-113. Since its inception field ware-
housing has been recognized as a financing device, 9' although it has other
minor uses such as controlling inventory supplies of franchised dealers.
Like that represented by the negotiable bill of lading, the security in-
terest represented by the field warehouse owes its existence to article 7.
However, since non-negotiable warehouse receipts are issued by field
warehousemen, the secured party's interest depends not so much on the
control of the document, as with negotiable receipts, but on the ware-
houseman's promise to hold possession for his benefit and on his instruc-
tions.92 Field warehousing was intended to separate ownership and
possession of the goods until the actual owner could discharge his obliga-
tion with regard to them, with the warehouseman serving as bailee for the
seller or lender. In the case of a seller, he has, in effect, completed his
entire duty in regard to the goods. They have been delivered to the actual
physical premises of the buyer. Unlike security interests obtained through
use of negotiable bills of lading, field warehousing does not exist as a
creature of article 2 nor do they arise out of the normal performance of
a sales contract." Section 9-113 should be inapplicable, and the field
warehouse security interest fully subject to article 9 rules.94
Even if the contract for sale should provide that title to the goods
should not pass until payment of the full purchase price, and that the
goods would be held in a field warehouse to be released on payment, the
reservation of title would constitute a security interest only on behalf of
the seller. 95 Since the only purpose of withholding title in a case such as
Allied is to retain an interest in the goods to secure payment of the
purchase price, then by virtue of section 2-102, use of the field warehouse,
should not hold the seller subject to article 2 rules, including rules on
default. The seller objectively intends to become a secured lender, or, at
least, intends to obtain for himself the benefits of being in the position
91. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907); Union Trust Co. v. Wilson,
198 U.S. 530 (1905).
92. For example, to effect a complete transfer of goods upon which a non-negotiable
document is issued, the bailee must merely be notified of the transfer. § 2-503(4) (b) ; to
procure delivery of such goods from the bailee, the document need not be surrendered.
§ 7-403(3).
93. Field warehouses are installed on the borrowers premises and the borrower pays
their cost, for they provide him with a financing device. See Stroh, Reduction of Lending
Risks in Inventory Financing, 31 Mo. L. REv. 209 (1966).
94. It is true that art. 2 does provide for transfer of ownership of goods in the
possession of a bailee, § 2-503 (4) ; however, the writer submits that such provision applies
only to goods in the bailee's possession at the time of the execution of the contract.
95. § 2-401(1).
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of a secured lender, whether he thinks of himself as one or not. His inter-
est in the goods as an owner of the goods has terminated, his duties
toward the goods have come to an end, his interest now lies only in being
paid, and his rights in the goods lie only in securing the payment of the
sum outstanding by the buyer. He has become a lender in spirit, if not
in his own mind.
The Code, in its economic analysis of sales and security transactions,
recognizes and classifies the parties according to their actual interests
rather than by their common law titles, and would characterize the one-
time seller as a lender and the one-time buyer as a borrower, and subject
them to total application of article 9. This characterization would be
effective even though in the earlier stages of the series of transactions,
the parties would have been subject to article 2 rules and the saving pro-
visions of section 9-113. The transaction now, in the words of section
2-102, is "intended to operate only as a security transaction." And, it is
submitted, this categorization by the Code establishes the basis for ap-
plication of non-Code law to the parties in their character as determined
by the Code.
IV. WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ARTICLE 9
When the parties to a commercial transaction find themselves con-
verted into lender and debtor from lessor and lessee or seller and buyer,
the conversion affects their rights and duties toward each other, the goods
in question and third parties, and the rights of third parties as established
both within and without the Code.
Consider, for example, the claim of the bailor, Procter, in the Allied
case. Generally there is no question that the absolute owner of goods can
recover their value in full from a commercial warehouseman who fails to
deliver. The goods are his, and unless the bailee can establish some lawful
excuse or justification for failure to deliver, the bailee must "buy" them
at conversion or contract damages. 9 A problem arises, however, when
ownership of the goods or ownership and lawful possession of the goods
are divided.
The person whose possession of goods is rightful, such as a bailee,
may recover the full value of the goods from the person who wrongfully
took possession from him, subject to the duty to account to the owner for
his interest." Likewise, the owner of the goods such as a pledgor may
recover their value, subject to a similar duty toward other special inter-
96. § 7-403(1) obliges the bailee to deliver; § 1-106(2) gives the "person entitled under
the document" an action.
97. Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951) (no
need to join bailor); Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465
(W.D. Mo. 1955) (bailee sues as quasi-trustee); Southern Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Road-
way Express, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 458, 122 S.E.2d 147 (1961).
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ests.9 8 Thus, a warehouseman,"9 or a pledgee °° may recover the full value
from a converter subject to the duty to account to the bailor or the pled-
gor. Deducting his accrued charges, the warehouseman must account for
the recovery of the goods to the depositor. Because the pledgee's interest
is that of a secured lender, he may deduct the value of his loan before
making payment to the debtor-pledgor. Similarly, the pledgor may
recover the value of the goods, but must account for the loan to the
pledgee.
When ownership of the goods is divided either into equitable and
legal title, legal title and mortgagee's lien, or beneficial ownership and
title retained for security, the result is still the same, should a third party
who has no lawful relation to the goods damage them or take them. Which-
ever of the less-than-full owners should sue, he may recover the full value
of the goods, but must account for the recovery to the other ownership
interests.'' The origin of the rule was in common law procedure. Origi-
nally, there could be but two interests represented in an action at law.
Rather than compel each person having an interest in the property to
maintain his own suit for his own special interest, which could result in
inconsistent verdicts upon failure of proof by one plaintiff, or a claim of
prejudice of jury members if both cases were tried in the same term (in
addition such multiplicity of lawsuits raised the specter of that favorite
judicial shibboleth, "opening the floodgates of litigation," i.e., the clogged
docket)' 2 the courts allowed the holder of a special interest in the prop-
erty to recover its full value. There was little, if any, harm in this and
much good. The wrongdoer would be punished and the persons represent-
ing other interests in the property could look to the plaintiff, who having
acknowledged his special interest in the main suit, could hardly claim
absolute ownership when met by a demand to account. In fact, it was
most probable that the holders of the various interests in the property
would cooperate in the suit through a common attorney, by agreement to
share expenses and costs and by pooling of efforts.
Under Civil Code and Federal Rules type procedure there is less
reason to allow the special interest holder to make a recovery in full,
98. Polytinsky v. Sharpe, 211 Ala. 510, 100 So. 750 (1924) ; Fairbanks v. Chunn, 2 Ala.
App. 642, 56 So. 847 (1911); Kaufmann v. Parmele, 99 Neb. 622, 157 N.W. 342 (1916) ;'
Treadwell v. Clark, 190 N.Y. 51, 82 N.E. 505 (1907) (equitable proceeding). Contra,
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 38 (1941). In general, under Code pleading, a pledgor could
not sue in trover, which was a possessor's action; he could sue for proceeds in assumpsit or
in an action on the case for value.
99. Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951);
Southern Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 458, 122 S.E.2d
147 (1961).
100. Graham v. Frazier, 82 Ga. App. 185, 60 S.E.2d 833 (1950); Hanover Nat'l Bank
v. American Dock & Trust Co., 14 App. Div. 255, 43 N.Y.S. 544 (1897).
101. Prime Business Co. v. Drinkwater, 350 Mass. 642, 216 N.E.2d 105 (1966) (mort-
gage) ; Equitable Credit Corp. v. Treadwell, 338 Mass. 96, 153 N.E.2d 882 (1958) (mortgage).
102. No Friday afternoons off for golf, or whatever they did in the days of the good
old common law.
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since, if all of the interests are agreed, they may sue jointly in their own
names as plaintiffs or may be joined as third parties if unwilling. There
is even less reason to allow a full recovery by a special interest holder
where injustice could result in the form of a double or an excessive
recovery by the plaintiff or against the defendant, or where plaintiff, de-
fendant and the other interest holders all have some lawful relationship
to the goods. So, where a mortgagee sues a mortgagor or a pledgee sues the
pledgor for damage to the goods, plaintiff can recover only to the extent
of his interest,10 3 and in a suit by the holder of warehouse receipts, who
holds as a secured lender, against the warehouseman, plaintiff can recover
only to the extent of his loan, i.e., his actual damages. 104
Field warehousing, although operating under the guise of commercial
warehousing, is quite a different animal and should be so recognized. It is
a financing device, and field warehouse receipts, non-negotiable receipts,
are intended by the financial trade and parties who borrow, and are under-
stood by them, to be symbols of the warehouseman's possession of the
goods on behalf of the lender. They are symbols of the bailee's promise to
hold the goods rather than symbols of the goods themselves. The security
of the holder of the field warehouse receipt lies in his control of the goods
through the warehouseman's agreement to hold possession for him. He
is a pledgee of the goods who is withholding possession from the pledgor
by use of a bailee.10 In actual practice the field warehouseman is more
than a bailee for hire or a stake holder. He is the lender's agent to hold
possession, 1 6 but he must also return whatever goods are left after the
pledge is satisfied or the arrangement terminated by the borrower, and
he is bound by law to do this.10 7 The field warehouseman then, is the alter
103. Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1952) (mort-
gagee); Rolfe v. Huntsville Lumber Co., 8 Ala. App. 487, 62 So. 537 (1913) (pledgee);
Murphy v. Wilson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 132, 314 P.2d 507 (1957) (mortgagee) ; First Nat'l
Bank v. Broder, 107 Conn. 574, 141 A. 861 (1928) (pledgee's suit against pledgor's privy).
See also Amery v. Augusta Lumber Co., 128 Me. 472, 148 A. 687 (1930) (conditional
seller). Similarly, in a suit by the pledgor, the pledgee is liable for the value of the property
less the unpaid balance of the loan. Larson v. Quanrud, Brink & Reibold, 78 N.D. 70, 47
N.W.2d 743 (1950); Rose City Foods, Inc. v. Bank of Thomas County, 207 Ga. 477, 62
S.E.2d 145 (1950) (pledgee's recovery of value of property limited by amount of loan);
Brandtjen & Kluge v. Hunter, 235 Mo. App. 909, 145 S.W.2d 1009 (1940) (mortgagee).
104. First Nat'l Bank v. Bates, 1 F. 702 (S.D. Ohio 1880); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Washington Loan & Banking Co., 167 Ga. 354, 145 S.E. 761 (1928); Corn Exch. Bank v.
American Dock & Trust Co., 14 App. Div. 453, 43 N.Y.S. 1028 (1897); Fifth Nat'l Bank
v. Providence Warehouse Co., 17 R.I. 112, 20 A. 203 (1890); Fletcher v. Great Western
Elevator Co., 12 S.D. 643, 82 N.W. 184 (1900).
105. See generally Stroh, Reduction of Lending Risks in Inventory Financing, 31 Mo.
L. REv. 209, 218-226 (1966).
106. Field warehouse recepits are issued directly to the lender, although the goods are
typically deposited by the borrower in a straight lending transaction. In the Allied case,
although the seller shipped the oil to its own order, Allied's (the borrower-buyer) men took
charge of the oil and presumably pumped it into Field's tanks; again the receipts were issued
directly to Procter, the seller.
107. The depositor-borrower is the true owner of the goods and has absolute ownership
once the interest of the pledgee or receipt holder has ended. In such a case, the bailee may
deliver to the owner even though receipts on the goods are outstanding. § 7-403(1) (a).
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ego of each when faced by suit by the other. After successful suit for
conversion by the receipt holder, for the full value of the stored goods, the
warehouseman would still be subject to suit at least for value in excess of
the loan by the depositor or borrower. The receipt holder's recovery
would be no bar to the depositor's suit. The lender (field warehouse
receipt holder), whether his posture is that of financing seller or third
party lender, should no more be allowed to make a full recovery on the
amount of the goods called for in the receipt, except to the extent that the
loan equals or exceeds the value of the goods, than a mortgagee or pledgee
should be allowed to make full recovery against the mortgagor or pledgor
for their conversion of the goods.
Within the confines of the Code, sales aspects of a commercial trans-
action involving goods are governed by article 2,108 but when the trans-
action converts into a secured transaction by the objectively judged intent
of the parties, that area is governed by article 9. Rules of article 9 which
may apply disasterously to disguised or unsuspected security interests are
primarily those dealing with enforceability, perfection, priority, and
default.
A security agreement is an agreement which creates or provides for
a security interest.109 Security interests in goods are unenforceable with-
out regard to dollar limitation on the bottom side, except as to article 2
security interests which exist regardless of security agreements and are
protected by section 9-113, unless there is a security agreement either
memorialized by a signed writing or evidenced by the possession of the
secured party, or someone for him."' This is a Statute of Frauds type
provision which prevents enforcement against either the debtor or third
parties. In contrast, the general Code "Statute of Frauds" provides a
$5,000.00 bottom"' and the Sales provision establishes a $500.00 lower
limit with several saving provisions."' Thus, a secured party could find
himself with an unenforceable security agreement on what he believed
was an enforceable contract for sale whether for goods he had sent to
the buyer or for goods upon which he had sent a written confirmation
of a "sales contract,' ' 3 and be able, therefore, to avail himself neither
of the article 9 default provisions" 4 nor of the article 2 provisions for
breach of contract, the latter being expressly inapplicable to security as-
pects of a sale. 1 5 He would, in fact, be merely a general creditor.
108. See Comment § 2-102.
109. § 9-105(1)(h).
110. §§ 9-203(1)(a), (b).
111. § 1-206(1).
112. § 2-201(1).
113. § 2-201(2) gives force to contracts between "merchants" which are "confirmed" in
writing by one, and not objected to by the other within 10 days of receipt.
114. Since his security agreement is unenforceable.
115. § 2-102.
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Assuming that the evidentiary requirements of section 9-203 are
met by the chattel acquisition lease or the written contract for sale which
constitutes the "agreement," the security interest will attach to the goods
as soon as the lender gives "value," which does not necessarily require the
actual transfer of the goods, and the borrower acquires "rights" in the
collateral." 6
Once the buyer-debtor acquires "rights" in the goods, third persons
and other security interests may then reach out for the collateral. 117 Per-
fection of a security interest immunizes it against one or more classes
of third persons who may attempt to assert rights to it. These are persons
who have no prior contract or property rights to such goods, primarily
lien creditors, but also various subsequent buyers of sorts." 8 In general,
perfection is accomplished as soon as the security interest has attached
and the lender either has possession or has filed a financing state-
ment." 9 Perfection is good protection against any lien creditor attempt-
ing to reach the collateral after perfection. 2 ' Filing may not be suffi-
cient protection against a subsequent buyer of inventory in the ordinary
course of business.' 2 ' Possession is the only safe means of perfection
against such a claimant since the debtor-seller cannot gain access to the
goods to make delivery. Filing is, however, good protection against the
claim of a buyer of that which in the hands of the debtor-seller is "equip-
ment."' 22 Prohibition against alienability of collateral are ineffective
against any buyer from the buyer-debtor, insofar as the debtors rights
may always be transferred. 2' If the security interest is also unperfected,
then the debtor-seller can transfer not only his own rights in the collateral
to any other buyer who does not have actual knowledge of the lender's
interest, but he can cut off those of the lender as well. 24 Placing stickers
on leased equipment giving notice of the lease, in lieu of filing, if a chattel
acquisition lease is used, is risky against both lien creditors 25 and
buyers1 26 since the lessor, to protect his interest after levy or sale, must
prove that the creditor or buyer had actual knowledge of his security
interest, if the lease is found to be a security agreement.
116. § 9-204(1).
117. § 9-204(1). The definition of "rights" does not give much help, § 1-201(36).
Presumably a buyer of goods might have "rights" as soon as he acquired an insurable
interest in them. § 2-501.
118. § 9-301(1).
119. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305.
120. § 9-301(1)(a).
121. § 9-307.
122. The definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of business § 1-201(9) limits such
buyers to persons buying from others in the business of selling goods of that kind.
"Equipment" is defined as goods used primarily in business. § 9-109(2).
123. § 9-311.
124. Such buyers must give value and receive delivery.
125. If the lien creditor has actual knowledge of the unperfected security interest, his
levy is subordinate to the security § 9-301(1)(b).
126. § 9-301(1)(c), similarly with buyers.
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It has been suggested in the writer's conversations with other lawyers
that, with regard to equipment leases coupled with options to purchase or
to extend, the lessor might file a financing statement covering the equip-
ment which contains a proviso that the filing does not constitute an
admission that the transaction is anything else but a lease, but that the
lessor is filing to be on the safe side. Generally, this sort of two faced
posture does not appeal to the average business man, be he lessor or lessee,
and the lessee may protest vehemently, if he is attempting a bit of tax
timing, that filing may be a tip-off to curious tax people. But if the review-
ing court finds that the parties intended a security interest and if the
security interest is not perfected, lien creditors, including trustees in
bankruptcy,'27 can destroy the lender's interest in the collateral relegating
him to the extremely undesirable status of a general creditor in bank-
ruptcy.
If perfection describes the status of the lender's interest in the
property with regard to the claims of third parties, then priority describes
the relationship of the lender's interest to the property and those claims,
and the claims of other secured lenders. In the terms of the Code, priority
rules are stated to apply to claims of other secured creditors and the
claims of lien creditors and buyers. The claims of all third parties seeking
an interest in the property are dealt with as a matter of priority. 12 If
a security interest is immunized against the claims of a certain class of
persons, for example, lien creditors, it is prior to those claims which may,
in turn, still attach to the property and be prior to the claims of others.
Similarly, the claim of a buyer of inventory collateral in the ordinary
course may be prior to the claims of all others.
Generally, priority between claims of secured creditors is governed
by the means of perfection and the order in which the interests are per-
fected. 129 The chattel acquisition lease particularly may fall afoul of the
priority claims of other secured lenders who have made a broad filing
covering all of the debtor's equipment whenever acquired and who have
placed an after-acquired property clause in their security agreements
when it could actually have taken a boost in priority status. 30 Straight
127. Trustees in bankruptcy occupy the same position as lien creditors, except that they
do not have knowledge of the unperfected security interest unless all lien creditors had such
knowledge § 9-301(3). The trustee's interest is expandable to the full dimensions of the
value of the property. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), and not limited to the size of the
interest of any particular lien creditor.
128. § 9-301(1) deals with the claims of lien creditors and buyers in terms of subordina-
tion of unperfected security interests to certain claims. § 9-307(1) dealing with buyers in
the ordinary course does not speak in terms of priority but in those of absolute cut off,
§ 9-312 arranges the priority relationship between competing secured interests.
129. Although purchase money financing is granted a special status by §§ 9-312(3) and.
(4), § 9-312(5) contains the general priority provisions for goods.
130. The after-acquired property clause in the security agreement provides for instant
and automatic accretion of after-acquired property to the security interest, so long as
other pre-requisites for attachment are met, see §§ 9-204(1) and (3). The financing state..
SECURITY INTERESTS
equipment leases are not subject to article 9 since they do not create
security interests, and the lessor's interest could not be cut off by a
secured creditor.' The lessor, in a chattel acquisition lease, however, is
a purchase money financer with a security interest and as such has the
opportunity of obtaining a prior status for his interest in the equipment
leased if he perfects within ten days after the debtor acquires possession
of the collateral. 32 However, to perfect, the lessor must realize that he
has a security interest, and he must file.
Even if there were no pre-existing security interest covering the
leased property, a subsequent perfected security interest granted by the
lessee which covered that property would take priority over the lessor's
interest.38 In the unlikely event that the holder of the later security
interest did not perfect, then, and only then, would the chattel acquisition
lessor prevail, since his interest attached first.'34
Although the requirements for obtaining stepped up priority for a
purchase money interest in inventory are more stringent,' 35 the question
would not have arisen in a situation similar to the Allied case even if
there had been a pre-existing filing covering after-acquired oil, where a
field warehouseman retained, actual possession of the goods. In the case
of inventory financing, the conflicting, pre-existing security holder must
be notified of the claim of the purchase money lender before the debtor-
buyer receives possession. l 6 Since legal possession of the goods would
be withheld from the debtor by the warehouseman until the debt had
been paid, the purchase money interest would be free of the claim of any
pre-existing interest, section 9-312(3) not coming into play. However, if
the goods were released to the debtor from the field warehouse, the claim
of the pre-existing security holder would be stronger and would prevail.1 37
ment may be phrased in terms of "all road-building equipment, whenever acquired" without
the need to itemize, see § 9-401(1).
131. § 9-102(1). The lessor's interest in the rents payable and his reversion in the
property may be subjected to security interests, however, by the lessor who wants to
finance on his property. See Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694
(8th Cir. 1959).
132. § 9-312(4). Perfection would have to be by filing.
133. The priority status of a secured lender is not affected by his knowledge of the
existence of other security interests; security interests are rated only by the order of
certain objective acts. § 9-312(5).
134. § 9-312(5)(c).
135. The purchase money financer on inventory must make sure his interest is perfected
at the time that the borrower receives possession and he must serve notice on pre-existing
secured parties. § 9-312(3).
136. There is some question whether or not § 9-312(3) was intended to apply to posses-
sory security interests, since § 9-312(3)(b) speaks of the holder of the purchase money
security interest as making a filing. If § 9-312(3) does not apply, then § 9-312(5)(b)
would. It may also be questioned whether or not the "possession" of the borrower in
§ 9-312(3) would be satisfied by delivery to a field warehouseman on his premises.
137. Although a possessory security interest remains perfected for twenty-one days
after goods are released to the borrower, § 9-304(5), this perfection appears to relate only
to lien creditor attacks and not to claims of other secured lenders.
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A literal reading of section 9-312 develops a disturbing conflict in the
Allied situation if section 9-312(3) is inapplicable. Section 9-312(5) pro-
vides that, where other priority rules do not govern, conflicting interests
are judged by order of perfection where one or both are not perfected by
filing. Perfection can only occur at or after the time of attachment of the
security interest. A security interest perfected by filing with an after-
acquired property clause in both the financing statement and security
agreement could pick up newly acquired property as soon as the debtor
acquired rights in it. The security interest of the seller-lender obtained
by field warehousing could literally attach and be perfected at no sooner
time. Common sense, of course, demands that the seller-lender, whether
or not he realizes he has a security interest, be given priority so long as
he maintains a perfected interest and takes any special steps required for
priority in special situations.
Upon the debtor's default, the rights and duties of both lender and
debtor are as provided in the security agreement, subject to certain
limitations on the secured party as set out in section 9-207, dealing with
possessory security interests and the secured party's possession after de-
fault, and in part 5 of article 9, which deals with the manner in which the
lender must look to the collateral to satisfy the debt. It should be pointed
out that most of the debtor's rights and lender's duties under part 5 of
article 9 cannot be waived,138 or, if they are waivable by the debtor, can-
not be waived prior to the debtor's defaultle 9 Thus, default provisions
common in leases, such as those allowing absolute repossession upon de-
fault as satisfaction of the lessor's claim for future rents or permitting
a subsequent sale without any accounting for surplus are ineffective if the
lease is a chattel acquisition lease. Whether or not a lender-seller has
retained title in a contract for sale, and the title retention was objectively
intended to serve as security, he is not the absolute owner of the goods,
and he, too, is subject to the same provisions governing accounting for
surpluses and repossession as the out-and-out lender since his article 2
rights vanished at the time of the creation of the security interest and he
became subject then to article 9.
V. REPRISE
It has been the intention of the writer to suggest that it is no longer
sufficient for counsel to examine and pass upon a commercial transaction
138. § 9-501(3).
139. After default, the lender has the right to take possession of the collateral, § 9-50.3,
and has the right to dispose of it, § 9-504(1). Prior to disposition of the collateral, the
borrower or a subordinated secured party has the right to redeem the collateral, unless he
waives this right after default. The secured party, after taking possession, may propose to
accept it in satisfaction of the borrower's obligation, and if the borrower fails to object
within thirty days, the secured party may retain the collateral, § 9-505(1). If he elects to
dispose of the collateral, he must account to the borower for the proceeds and pay over any
surplus to him, § 9-504(2).
SECURITY INTERESTS
purely in terms of formal legal characterization based on the often self-
serving words of the parties to the arrangement under scrutiny. Sections
9-102(1) and 1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial Code raise ques-
tions with regard to leases, sales, and other transactions which are deter-
minable only by a finding of the intent of the parties, and this intent
must be resolved by an approach in terms of function and practical eco-
nomics within the framework of the law. Analysis of intent is no longer
a question so much of the form into which a transaction is cast, as it is a
question of ascertaining the result within the law which the parties
desired to accomplish, and then classifying. The question to be asked is:
What is the function and result of the transaction in that particular
situation?
Article 2 with its departure from the concept of title in determining
the rights of the parties to a sales transaction, seems to go further than
the other articles of the Code in the economic, practical, functional or
transactional approach, as you will, to commercial law, yet it points the
direction and sets the tenor for analysis and examination of other Code
transactions. 140 And certainly, in the area of secured transactions, section
9-202, rendering the location of title immaterial in the application of
article 9 rules, carries the same germ. That the determination that a
transaction constitutes a security interest places the parties and the
collateral within article 9 is clear, except where specifically excluded by
sections 9-104 and 9-113. It is not clear yet that such a characterization
places the parties into a debtor-lender position rather than that of lessee-
lessor or of vendee-seller for application of law outside of the Code, in
the area of, for example, damages or rights against third parties other
than those of priority and perfection. The writer believes that it does.
The parties to a transaction, whether it be a pure sale, a commercial
loan, or what have you, above all must know what they are doing, what
end they are trying to reach, when they couch their arrangement in one
form or another. They must also know to what end the form of trans-
action they are using will lead. If they do not know, the courts will
eventually tell them what they intended, and in so doing may supply an
unexpected and costly answer. Substantial justice, curbstone equity, and
judicial interpretation of the intent of the parties have a distinct place in
our system of law.' They have, however, no place in commercial law as
140. See, e.g., King, New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code: Ethics,
Title and Good Faith Purchase, 11 St. Louis L.J. 15 (1966); King, The New Con-
ceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 30 (1965).
141. "[T]he whole matter floats nebulously in that fog, 'the intent of the parties' out
of which courts are so apt to evoke what they most want." L. Hand, In re German Pub-
lication Soc'y, 289 F. 509, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
A judge . . . violates his duty as a minister of justice . . . if he seeks to do what
he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards
the general law as he knows it to be binding on him.
A.B.A. CANONS OF JUDICAL ETHICS No. 20.
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applied between merchants and other businessmen. For one thing, too
much money is involved. In a commercial transaction, the sole criterion
of acceptability is predictability and pre-litigation control of outcome.
Where the courts are called upon to determine the intent of the parties,
and the determination of this intent controls the outcome, this is ob-
viously not always possible. Yet this hazard may be largely overcome by
establishing the function the transaction is to perform and not hiding
it under an anomalous or ambiguous formalism. That control by counsel
of clients may be impossible in some circumstances is true. He may not
be consulted, or he may be overruled. But he should be able to inform
his principals of the attendant areas of danger and suggest alternatives,
even though he cannot or will not forbid. It is only through an avoidance
of the mindless use of legal forms and an approach to a transaction in
terms of economic substance and function, with a thorough understanding
of what the Uniform Commercial Code means, that this can be done.
